ISWAP Uses Financial Rewards to Recruit Fighters and Target Military Bases in the Lake Chad Region

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a faction of Boko Haram, has developed a financial incentive system that rewards fighters for capturing weapons, ammunition and military equipment during attacks on Nigerian and neighbouring countries' military bases. According to new research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the group operates a structured payment mechanism funded by Islamic State to encourage participation in military operations and strengthen its fighting capabilities.
Unlike its rival faction, Jama’at Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), which frequently targets civilians and engages in robbery, ISWAP has concentrated much of its military activity on attacking security installations and capturing weapons. Previously, analysts attributed this strategy to the group's desire to expand its military resources, reduce dependence on arms traffickers and strengthen territorial control across the Lake Chad Basin. However, the latest findings indicate that financial rewards are another important motivation behind these operations.
A Structured Payment System for Captured Weapons
According to information collected by ISS from former fighters and individuals familiar with ISWAP's financial operations, the group maintains a formal system for distributing the proceeds of captured military equipment, known as ghanimah, or spoils of war. Under this arrangement, approximately one-third of the captured assets' assessed value is retained by the organisation, while the remaining share is distributed among fighters who participated in the operation.
The payment structure assigns specific values to different types of military equipment. An AK-47 is reportedly valued at US750,whilearocket-propelledgrenadecanearnafighterUS1,000. Ammunition boxes are valued between US500andUS1,000, depending on their calibre. A pickup truck equipped with a heavy weapon can reportedly generate a reward of US$30,000.
Payments are made in Nigerian naira, making the rewards financially significant in a region where employment opportunities and household incomes remain limited.
Economic Vulnerability Supports Militant Recruitment
The financial incentives become particularly attractive when compared with the economic conditions across the Lake Chad region, which includes Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. National minimum monthly wages in these countries range from approximately US53toUS108, while GDP per capita varies between US775andUS1,972.
In many conflict-affected border communities, actual earnings are considerably lower. Prolonged insecurity, economic instability and climate-related challenges have weakened local livelihoods, creating conditions that militant organisations can exploit to attract recruits.
The ISS research suggests that financial rewards play an important role in retaining fighters, particularly younger recruits who may not be strongly motivated by ideological beliefs. In addition to payments for captured equipment, ISWAP reportedly provides monthly salaries of approximately ₦75,000 to certain fighters through its internal revenue system. This amount is slightly higher than Nigeria's national minimum wage of ₦70,000.
Different Strategies of ISWAP and JAS
The financial structures adopted by the two Boko Haram factions also influence their relationships with civilian populations. ISWAP generally maintains tighter control over its fighters, restricting the unauthorised use of weapons and discouraging individual acts of robbery against civilians. Its fighters typically carry weapons when deployed for operations.
JAS, in contrast, relies more heavily on direct exploitation, robbery and attacks against civilian communities, including camps for displaced people. The absence of comparable organisational discipline allows its fighters greater opportunities for individual predatory activities.
These differences demonstrate how the financial arrangements of militant organisations can shape their operational priorities and relationships with communities under their influence. While ISWAP's approach does not eliminate violence against civilians, its structured system of rewards helps explain its preference for organised military raids over random attacks and opportunistic ambushes.
Strengthening Counterterrorism Beyond Military Operations
The findings highlight the need for counterterrorism strategies that address the financial and organisational networks sustaining militant groups. Targeting senior commanders and disrupting battlefield operations remain important, but these measures alone may not weaken an organisation capable of maintaining recruitment through salaries, captured equipment and structured financial rewards.
Authorities across the Lake Chad region must also focus on disrupting funding channels, arms trafficking networks and the economic structures that support militant recruitment. Improving employment opportunities, strengthening border security and supporting vulnerable communities can further reduce the appeal of financial incentives offered by extremist organisations.
Ultimately, ISWAP's reward system demonstrates that militant recruitment is driven not only by ideology but also by organised financial interests. Understanding these economic mechanisms is essential for developing more effective regional security measures and preventing extremist organisations from rebuilding their operational capabilities.



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